The bells are jingling, the trees glittering, and the last Law Column of 2024 awaits…
18/12/2024
It has been another busy trip round the sun in the legal world and as is often customary at the end of the year, we have taken a dive into Santa’s sack to revisit some of the most significant legal developments that we have covered in 2024.
We kicked off the year in January with a column discussing a decision from the High Court concerning the protection of journalistic sources. Whilst not an issue that tends to come up frequently, it is of course a cornerstone of press freedom in our society. In a decision reinforcing those principles, the Court refused to grant an Order which would compromise the source of information relating to the hacking of certain email accounts.
Whilst it was argued by the applicant that the evidence given had not been successful in establishing a serious risk of compromising the respondent’s source, the Judge was satisfied that even disclosure of the information in a redacted form would pose a risk of revealing the identity of the source. Though the case did not break any new ground, it provided welcome confirmation that the courts are not prepared to drive a sleigh (with or without reindeer) through the vital protections provided to press freedom by the law.
Moving into March, and across the border to Northern Ireland, we found ourselves considering a relatively new piece of legislation that came into force in the latter part of 2023. Section 12(2) of the Justice (Sexual Offences and Trafficking Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2022 prohibits publication of any information which is likely to lead members of the public to identify a person as being the subject of an allegation that he committed a sexual offence or was the subject of a police investigation.
Though this obligation ceases upon charge, if no charges are ever brought the prohibition remains in place until 25 years after the death of the suspect. The consequences of breaching these conditions are severe, extending to a possible custodial sentence of up to six months and a fine of up to £5,000.
What was paticularly interesting was the unintended consequence of this provision on reporting certain historic child abuse cases involving former clergymen. The Church had already acknowledged and apologised for the individual’s offending, and the matter been widely reported before the legislation had come into force. The fact that the suspect had died before charges could be brought against him meant, as ludicrous as it seems, that he could no longer be identified.
March was a busy month, and we also delved into updates made to the rehabilitation periods for offences committed in England and Wales. This was the first change made to these provisions since 2014 and whilst the effects of the changes did not alter the way in which rehabilitation periods should be considered as part of publication, it provided a useful reminder of the fact that spent convictions can still be published as long as doing so is in the public interest.
It is of course important to remember however, that one quirk of this is that where spent convictions are concerned, the truth defence can be defeated by malice. This is on the basis that criminal history of an individual should only be revealed where there is good reason to do so, to enable those who have been properly rehabilitated to make the most of their second chance.
The next gift under the tree comes from June where we took a look at the concept of vulgar abuse. As I am sure you all know, the definition of a libel covers myriad possibilities and great difficulty often comes with drawing that all important line between a statement which constitutes libel, and that which can instead be labelled as “vulgar abuse”.
Vulgar abuse refers to statements which although undoubtedly rude and offensive, do not carry a defamatory meaning. This concept was illustrated in the summer by the case of Vine v. Barton where ex-footballer Joey Barton made some not very festive, but not ultimately libelous, comments about broadcaster Jeremy Vine. The Judge cited a previous decision from 2008 where vulgar abuse was defined as a statement made in the heat of the moment, which was not intended to be taken seriously.
Whilst at first glance, this seems to go against the general principle that intention is irrelevant, it is a more nuanced point than that. Context is everything, and whilst words expressed in the heat of the moment are often chosen without careful consideration, that is not a defence to libel but it will be taken into consideration as part of the wider context of the issue as a whole.
Which brings us to the last gift in the Law Column sack, a piece from October, where you may recall that we discussed a really (genuinely!) interesting update to the Civil Procedure Rules (the CPR). These rules, which govern the conduct of litigation in England and Wales were updated to give the Courts the power to order that parties to a dispute must engage in Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) before resorting to court.
This was a significant change in the approach of the Courts, which previously were prohibited from forcing this type of non-judicial dispute resolution on the parties to a dispute, in spite of the fact that ADR is often a quicker, more flexible and, most importantly, less expensive way of resolving disputes as opposed to a traditional trial.
We all know that the costs of litigation range from expensive to astronomical, and this power, though not absolute, represents an acknowledgement from policymakers that there is a need to reduce those costs and prevent the rush to litigation so often seen from claimants who seek to capitalise on a genuine mistake from a publisher.
As always, the developments we have witnessed over the last 12 months have been a mixed bag and we must now wait and see how the various updates and changes settle over time.
For now, all that remains is for me and the rest of the team at Jaffa Law to wish you all a Merry Christmas and a very happy new year!