How libel claims can be struck out as SLAPPs under new law
20/04/2026
Publishers have been given a first look at how judges will decide whether to use a new anti-SLAPP law to throw out libel cases.
The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 included provisions designed to prevent improper use of the legal system to suppress legitimate reporting on matters of public interest related to combating economic crime.
The Civil Procedure Rules were updated to give a court a distinct power to strike out a libel claim if it appeared to be a SLAPP within the meaning of section 195 of the 2023 Act and the claimant failed to show that it is more likely than not the claim would succeed at trial.
But the power had never been used until a tax barrister, Setu Kamal, sued solicitor turned legal blogger Dan Neidle and his company, Tax Policy Associates Ltd, for £8million in libel.
The claimant alleged that Neidle had published a blog which held defamatory and untrue meanings, that Kamal was professionally involved in unlawful or discredited tax avoidance schemes; that he provided advice that was reckless, unethical or incompetent; that disciplinary or regulatory action ought to be taken against him, and that he poses a risk to clients and the public.
High Court judge Mrs Justice Collins Rice said all of the pleaded meanings were clearly expressions of opinion, and ruled that Kamal had no real prospect of defeating an honest opinion defence.
Consequently, she ordered that summary judgment should be granted in favour of the defendants.
But Neidle and Tax Policy Associates went further, arguing Kamal’s claim should be labelled a statutory SLAPP – a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation.
Section 195 states that claim is a “SLAPP” if, firstly, the claimant’s behaviour has, or is intended to have, the effect of restraining the defendant’s exercise of the right to freedom of speech; and secondly, it requires that any of the information disclosed by the exercise of freedom of speech has to do with economic crime.
This will either be when the information relates to behaviour or circumstances which a defendant reasonably believed to be evidence of the commission of an economic crime, or when the defendant had reason to suspect that an economic crime may have occurred and believed publishing the information would facilitate an investigation into whether it had.
No economic crime needs to have been demonstrably committed, but a publisher requires to hold – broadly – the subjective belief which is objectively reasonable.
In this case, Collins Rice J accepted Neidle had reason to suspect the offence of ‘cheating the revenue’ may have occurred and he believed at the time that publishing the article would facilitate an investigation into whether it had.
The third test is that any part of the disclosure of information must be made for a purpose related to the public interest in combating economic crime. It is sufficient for any part of the publication, not the article in its entirety, to be made for this purpose. It need not be the only or principal purpose, so long as it is a purpose.
Collins Rice J said this is not a “public interest test”, rather the statute means that combatting economic crime is a general public good and the purpose of the publication need only be related to it.
In this case, the judge found one of the purposes of Neidle’s article was creating an improved industry where what Neidle sees as tax avoidance schemes are tackled.
Collins Rice J emphasised that meeting the tests thus far does not in itself imply or suggest in any way that a claimant has done anything untoward.
Finally, for a SLAPP to be declared, the claimant must have behaved in a way that was intended to cause the defendant(s) various adversities or inconvenience (such as harassment, alarm or distress, and expense) “beyond that ordinarily encountered in the course of properly conducted litigation”.
Collins Rice J said this final test was the “distinguishing feature” of a SLAPP, because it is all about how a claim is conducted.
When determining this final test, the court should have reference to whether there is disproportionality between the costs of a claim and the remedy sought, and a claimant’s selection of a defendant on the basis of inequality of resource.
The judge said a clear marker of a potential SLAPP is a claim brought by a wealthy and powerful suspected wrongdoer against a “valiant but modestly financed lone journalist seeking to expose their wrongdoing, rather than against the well-resourced media organisation that published the journalist’s report”. Collins Rice J said the court can consider whether the claimant has created a David and Goliath contest in resource terms when trying to infer the intention of the claimant.
A court can also take into account failure by a claimant to comply with the rules and principles governing properly conducted litigation, such as pre-action protocols, rules of court or practice directions; and should ask itself questions about whether jurisdictional choices, excessive demands for disclosure, responsiveness to requests for comment or clarification, the use of correspondence, and approach to alternatives to litigation, have a bearing, when deciding what the Claimant intended.
Taking account the entire (extensive) litigation history, with Collins Rice J applying the statutory SLAPP test “at a granular level”, the SLAPP test was found to be met in this case.
The details – which are too lengthy to relate in full here – included a claim that failed to comply with the relevant rules and Practice Direction, and the deployment in inter-partes correspondence of generative AI hallucinations.
But the judgment overall will be a welcome one for publications that live in fear of receiving oppressive claims for massive damages. The High Court has sent out a clear signal that such behaviour could be grounds for a strike out, adding significantly to the libel defendant’s arsenal.
Mr. Kamal, who was unrepresented and acted as a litigant in person, has suggested he may appeal the decision. It remains to be seen how the Court of Appeal would interpret the SLAPP test.
Neidle’s subsequent revelation that defending himself meant £146k spent in legal costs is a further reminder – if any were needed – that defamation cases must never be entered into lightly.